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introduCtion
The disjuncture between the promises of foreign 
aid and its ‘poor outcomes’ has been a major 
concern for social scientists and policy makers 
globally. It has come under critical scrutiny from 
a number of scholars and public intellectuals. As a 
result, the issue of foreign aid and, more generally, 
international development, has seen contentious 
debates and polarising ideological arguments. 
These range from ‘aid reformists’ positions that 
view foreign aid and international development 
as a magic bullet to address the world’s poverty 
through global consensus approaches such as the 
Millennium Development Goals (MGDs) whose 
proponents continue to push for aid effectiveness 
and efficiency (Sachs 2005) to ‘aid radicals’ who 
blame foreign aid-funded projects for fuelling 
dependency and corruption (Moyo 2010; Easterly 
2007) and view it as a source of power, hegemony 
and governmentality (Ferguson 1994; Escobar 
2011). So intense has this debate between the aid 
radicals and aid reformists been that it has even 
been labelled ‘the Great Aid Debate’ (Gulrajani 
2011).
While very important in its own terms and 
attracting considerable attention, this debate is not 
only loaded with ideological arguments but also 
tends to overlook institutional processes and the 
role of actors, i.e., how delivery of aid and global 
development policies are mediated through a 
number of actors, institutions and arrangements. It 
is this ‘space in between’ that has been overlooked 
by ‘the Great Aid Debate’. The ‘aid reformers’ 
believe that aid can deliver if managed well and 
call for effective and efficient management of aid 
through new managerial logics such as result-based 
frameworks, value for money, and new institutional 
set-ups to reduce transactional costs, among others. 
Commenting on the dynamic framework of aid, 
Mosse (2005: 1) writes:
Western agencies such as the UK’s Department 
for International Development (DFID) and their 
policy advisers direct huge energy to re-framing 
development, discarding the signs of a colonial past 
or present-day commercial self-interest (i.e. tied aid), 
finding new focus and political legitimacy in the 
international goal of reducing global poverty, in the 
language of partnership and participation, citizens’ 
rights and democracy. 
Alongside these new foci and priorities, over the 
last decade or so, there has been a major shift in the 
field of international development and its modus 
operandi with approaches such as evidence-based 
development, result framework and outcomes 
shaping the institutional framework, working 
modalities and the practices on the ground. 
Banerjee and Duflo (2011), for instance, argue 
that development policies should be not be driven 
by politics but by robust evidence. Although very 
influential in the policy practice of foreign aid 
in recent years, this refocusing fails to critically 
scrutinise development aid and its practice as a part 
of politics, be it ideological or institutional.
The more critical perspectives of ‘aid radicals’, on 
the other hand, while theoretically engaging and 
politically informed, fail to look at the intricacies 
of institutional processes and diversity of interests 
and agency of different stakeholders (Mosse 2005). 
They overemphasise the role of ideology in over-
determining the outcomes of development.
Largely ignored in this ‘Great Aid Debate’ are 
the unintended consequences as well as various 
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institutional processes, political dynamics and 
interests of actors that shape the world of foreign 
aid and development. Despite the designs and 
continuous institutional reforms, international 
development practice has to contend with the 
everyday working of its staff and their interactions 
with development subjects, the bureaucracy, and 
brokers on the ground. In short, those who engage 
with foreign aid critically have rarely approached it 
as a ‘category of practice’ (Mosse 2013).
Development aid not only provides new streams 
of income, exercise of power and patronage but 
also offers new cosmopolitan discourses, generate 
different understandings on the ground (Pigg 
1992), and introduce vocabularies of promises, 
new management logics, awareness and ideologies. 
Development aid is a part of transnational 
networks that are not only geographically extensive 
and tie global institutions, ideas, discourses and 
professionals to national and local places but also 
institutional in that they link various international, 
national, local, governmental, non-governmental, 
for-profit and non-profit institutions, disciplines, 
technologies frameworks, knowledge systems and 
professionals.
Drafted as part of an ESRC/DFID-funded 
research project entitled ‘New Norms and Forms 
of Development’, this paper argues that the 
concept of brokers and brokerage offers a useful 
lens to understand the field of international 
development, and, through their practices, helps 
unpack complex networks and relationships of 
organisations, professionals, actors and their 
interests, ideologies, disciplines, technologies and 
aspirations. Conceptually, brokers are located in 
the ‘in-between spaces’ and they play a role in 
mediating relationships. Brokers trade in the gap in 
social structure and they help the flow of resources, 
services, opportunities and knowledge across that 
gap (Stoval and Shaw 2012). Brokers are actors that 
play a role in getting things done. Herein lies the 
dual role of brokers. On the one hand, brokerage 
has the potential to ease social, economic and 
political relationships and interactions while, on 
the other, it can produce exploitation through 
rent-seeking, corruption and accumulation of 
political, economic, social and cultural capital, 
and further worsen inequalities (Stoval and Shaw 
2012). Although there is long-standing interest 
in the social sciences on those who get things 
done, those who trade in gaps, and those who 
mediate relationships, resources and knowledge 
(although rarely are they known as brokers, 
except stockbrokers, labour brokers or knowledge 
brokers), it has not developed as a defined field of 
study.
There is a great deal of empirical evidence about 
the type of activity that can reasonably be called 
brokerage, and this makes it difficult to come up 
with a defined theoretical framework (Stoval and 
Shaw 2012: 153). Development studies has an 
emerging field of study on brokers and brokerage 
led by Bierschenk and others (2002), and followed 
up and expanded by Lewis and Mosse (2006). 
Thus, a study of brokers and brokerage in the 
transnational field of international development 
that contrasts lofty development objectives such 
as MDGs with the reality of poverty, ill health 
and suffering in low-income countries offers a 
useful conceptual framework through which 
one could approach how they help (dis)connect, 
translate, add or detract values that are part and 
parcel of the flow of this sector. The mediation 
of relationship between providers of funds 
(the providers), managers of such funds (the 
managers), designers and managers of projects 
and programmes (the designers, coordinators 
and programme managers), and implementers on 
the ground (implementers) offers useful insights 
on the politics, and practices and outcomes of 
development.
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neW managerialiSm and SubContraCting
The failures of foreign aid to meet planned 
expectations have led ‘aid reformers’ to borrow 
from neo-liberal ideas that focus on efficiency, 
high performance, audit culture, and value for 
money. Compassion or charitable interest is no 
longer considered sufficient for driving foreign 
aid. Commonly known as ‘new managerialism’, 
principles of management are deployed in NGOs 
and foreign aid-funded projects in low-income 
countries (Desai and Imrie 1998). Mosse (2005: 3) 
makes an observation that this new managerialism 
is driven by two trends, namely, narrowing 
of the ends of development to international 
development targets such as MDGs, and the 
broadening of the means to achieve these such 
as policies on good governance, public sector 
reform, civil society engagement and social capital. 
Neo-liberal policies pushed in the 1980s by the 
contemporaneous British Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher and American President Ronald Reagan, 
who viewed government not as a part of the 
solution but more as a part of the problem, were 
instrumental in pushing this agenda through global 
financial systems and the Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (Harvey 2005).
This shift is based on the belief that there 
are inherent inadequacies in traditional aid 
bureaucracies and, hence, advocates the insertion 
of new management and policy logics into 
public affairs. One such major organised move 
was the global consensus in 2005 when the 
main donors signed the Paris Declaration on 
Aid Effectiveness, which emphasised national 
ownership, harmonisation, alignment, results and 
mutual accountability. In signing the Declaration, 
the donors implicitly collectively admitted that 
since their modality of giving aid had been highly 
inefficient, they wanted to reform the system. A 
number of improvements in line with the above-
mentioned principles were proposed that included 
better coordination with each other and the 
recipient, enhancing country ownership, fostering 
partnerships, and aligning their work with the 
recipient country’s policies (Gulrajani 2011).
Neo-liberal governance, as a way to downsize 
the sluggish and inflexible administrative 
system of the state, was instrumental in 
introducing managerialism in the field of 
external assistance. This was primarily felt by 
the least developed countries through the World 
Bank/International Monetary Fund-promoted 
Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) 
that demanded austerity measures through 
mainly cutting public expenditure. One major 
aspect of this shift has been the subcontracting 
to non-profit and for-profit outfits to carry 
out service delivery activities. A key rationale 
for this shift is the uncritical assumption that 
NGOs and the private sector have a comparative 
advantage given that they can provide services 
more effectively and efficiently than overgrown 
public services (Watkins, Swidler and Hannan 
2012). Subcontracting is part of the change in 
the larger political-economic environment in the 
last three to four decades that has transformed 
the state into more of an ‘enabler’ whereby the 
funding has been administratively separated 
from the production of services. While public 
responsibility has been retained for policy and 
planning, financing, regulating, monitoring 
and audit, non-governmental providers, both 
non-profit and commercial organisations, are 
increasingly used to deliver a growing number of 
services (Kramer 1994: 34). This has meant that 
the non-state sector has become an important part 
of the aid management and delivery system. As a 
consequence, both non-profit and, increasingly, 
for-profit international development contractors 
have begun to occupy a more important place 
in international development, and it continues 
to be sustained and legitimised (Nagraj 2015). 
The growth globally of NGOs, INGOs and 
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international development private contractors is 
partly a reflection of this trend.
Dominant assessments continue to see the 
growth of I/NGOs as an expansion of the global 
civil society that rest upon shared liberal norms 
and values that motivate these organisations to 
take action and explain their supposedly benign 
influence globally. As we shall discuss later, this 
view does not adequately reflect the political 
economy and messy everyday practices relating to 
competition, material pressures, and insecurities 
that characterise the transnational field of 
international development. Although contractors 
and subcontractors in international development 
work for the humanitarian and development 
objectives, they are more likely to be shaped by 
their own political and economic considerations.
In her ethnography of expatriates, Hindman 
documents a demographic shift in the type of 
professionals entering the aid world who are hired 
on short-term contracts (Hindman 2011). She 
found that the subcontractors were getting paid 
much more to do the same work than long-term 
aid worker. This shift meant that those employed 
by aid agencies were either retiring or seeking to 
turn themselves into subcontractors to access the 
higher rates of pay. Further, they were devoting 
attention to the expansion of their own networks 
of professional contacts to secure subcontract and 
secure higher rates of pay. 
The new managerialism has spawned institutions 
that produce reports and guidelines on how to 
make aid more effective, involving and sustaining 
the livelihoods of government officials, civil society 
organisations, academics and consultants alike 
(Gulrajani 2011). At a broader level, initiatives 
such as the 2005 Paris Declaration have taken on 
a specific and dominant form where prescriptions 
for better delivery and management of foreign aid 
are separated from political dynamics and relations 
that shape the practices of aid delivery (Gulrajani 
2011: 209). The principles of ownership, alignment, 
harmonisation, result-based management and 
accountability are presented as technical and 
managerial processes wherein aid relations between 
donors and recipients, donor and intermediaries, or 
donor and governments are shaped by geographies 
of inequalities. An inquiry into the institutions of 
foreign aid and international development, thus, 
will need to look into the politics that shape these 
unequal relationships and transactions.
 
The expansion of evidence-based development 
(Banerjee and Duflo 2011), results-based 
framework and monitoring, and evaluation 
of professionals in aid agencies illustrate the 
widespread belief these new ideas would 
automatically lead to enhanced results (Smith, 
Mackintosh et al 2012). Momentous goals such 
as the MDGs were based on targets and the 
use of global development (governance/human 
rights) indicators, use of log-frames, and crafting 
of theories of change and various monitoring 
and evaluation frameworks and instruments 
are a part of this shift. UN agencies, multilateral 
donors such as the World Bank, bilateral donors 
such as DFID and USAID, and large INGOs 
such as Save the Children, Oxfam and World 
Vision are important actors contributing to 
this process. This new framework combines 
evidence and management as a way to reform 
aid bureaucracy and increase accountability. 
Although conceptualised as technical processes, 
these practices have important political effects on 
both the modality of development aid delivery 
and power dynamics amongst institutions and 
professionals. With simplification, quantification 
and de-contextualisation of results and processes 
becoming the norm, commitment, compassion 
and embedded forms of knowledge are less of 
a priority for the professional managerial class 
that have come to dominate the field (Gulrajani 
2011). These new norms and institutional forms 
of international development thus have important 
implications for development outcomes and, 
hence, that need ethnographic scrutiny to unpack 
the politics, processes as well as the actual working 
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toWardS Studying the ‘SpaCe in betWeen’: exploring the 
inStitutional field
of these institutional modalities. It is by going 
behind the technical and managerial structures 
we begin to explore how actual practice shapes the 
politics of aid.
Away from the ideological debates, a number 
of scholars have called for a move ‘beyond 
the critique’ and the need to re-engage with 
ethnographic meanings of development as a 
‘category of practice’ rather than a category of 
analysis (Mosse 2013: 229-230). This is a call for 
engagement with the practice of development 
aid so as to uncover its processes, negotiations, 
actors and their interests, institutional modalities, 
technologies and tools, perceptions, languages, 
and its socio-cultural and political effects. This 
is an attempt to go beyond the once-dominant 
discourse that saw development as dominance, 
rule or imposition. Instead, this approach calls 
for the uncovering of collaboration, negotiation 
and compromise that characterise the everyday 
practices of development. It is an attempt to 
challenge and question homogenising images and 
stereotypes of donors, recipient states, beneficiaries 
and development agencies such as INGOs or 
NGOs. As Mosse (2005: 8) puts it, the ethnographic 
question is not whether but how development 
projects work; not whether a project succeeds, but 
how ‘success’ is produced.
Scholars have examined this ‘space in between’ 
from a number of perspectives. 
Judith Justice’s ethnography of health and 
development bureaucracy in Nepal, Policies, Plans 
and People: Culture and Health Development in 
Nepal, was one of the earliest attempts to explore 
the ‘space in between’ development policies/plans 
and the target population. She asked: ‘How can 
the gap between the people on the receiving end 
of planning and the well-intentioned designs of 
planners often far removed from the recipients 
best be bridged, so that imagination and resources 
may achieve the most beneficial result?’ (Justice 
1989: 1). Justice set out a task to understand what 
information planners were basing plans and 
policies on, and why they were not using available 
socio-cultural information to inform their work. 
Her finding was revealing: ‘The planners and 
administrators I interviewed in Nepal and in the 
headquarters of donor agencies often decried social 
and cultural information as “soft” data, saying that 
it was too descriptive, too wordy and confusing, 
and too difficult to evaluate (Justice 1989: 135).’
The field of international development has 
undergone major shifts since Justice conducted 
her research over two decades ago. There are new 
institutional modalities (such as results framework) 
and expertise (monitoring and evaluation 
frameworks, including the use of Randomised 
Control Trials in development) in place that 
emphasise the value of socio-cultural data and 
active engagement with local partners, prioritise 
working with NGOs, civil society and private 
contractors, and focus on participation, results 
and accountability. More recently, the modality 
of foreign aid and development has focused on 
pilots and experiments, scaling up, importance of 
evidence, complete with managerial vocabulary 
such as results, outcomes and impacts (Crewe and 
Axelby 2013).
Scholars working within the framework of ‘actor-
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oriented approaches’ have argued for development 
policies and practices to be studied from the 
perspective of actors and stakeholders (Long 
and Long 1992; Lewis and Mosse 2006). They 
have argued how the processes of development 
can have different implications for the actors 
involved beyond the imagination of its architecture 
(Long and Long 1992). There are important 
differences reflecting the interests between the 
public discourses of development officials in 
Northern countries and the private conversations 
of experts in the field who are often aware of 
the complexity of real-life situations (de Sardan 
2005:4). This approach allows for an interrogation 
of the disjuncture between the formal objectives 
and strategies and the informal processes and 
the outcomes that emerge through the practices 
and interests of different stakeholders in different 
institutional contexts (Lewis et al 2003). Beyond 
the role of development actors, as indicated 
above, the field of international development 
is also characterised by complex transnational 
institutional arrangements involving institutions, 
frameworks and knowledge systems that shape the 
process, politics and outcomes.
Conceptually, transnational institutional forms 
shaped by aid can be approached as ‘aid chain 
and network approaches’ (Bebbington and 
Kothari 2006; Mosse 2005; Wallace, Bornstein and 
Chapman 2007; Watkins, Swidler and Hannan 
2012); ‘assemblages’ (Mosse 2005; Bebbington 
and Kothari 2006); or ‘political economy’ (Cooley 
and Ron 2002). Although scholarship has evolved 
in three distinct routes, these approaches are not 
mutually exclusive and there are important overlaps 
among the three.
Social networks, a study of institutional 
relationships and communication, have become 
a major theme in social science that has attracted 
considerable attention with the entry of the 
actor-network theory in studies of science and 
transnationalism (Bebbington and Kothari 2006). 
Likewise, the study of globalisation and global 
social change has produced a conceptualisation 
of flow of commodities, people, power, money, 
knowledge, information, discourses, materials 
and resources (Appadurai 1994). Global flows and 
networks often go together given that flows are 
channelled through complex webs that are in turn 
sustained and modified by these flows (Bebbington 
and Kothari 2006).
One of the defining features of foreign aid is that it 
is transnational in nature. Donors, who are usually 
located in the Global North, must go through 
a chain of actors—international organisations, 
national organisations and professionals as well 
as individual professionals and consultants within 
this chain—to reach their intended beneficiaries 
in the Global South (Bebbington 2004, Wallace, 
Bornstein and Chapman 2007). A variety of 
organisations receive aid, increasingly through 
competitive bidding, and then form partnerships 
with other organisations to implement projects 
and programmes after retaining a percentage 
of the aid for their overheads, management and 
technical costs. These NGOs or private contractors 
subcontract the projects and programmes in the 
aid chain further before it reaches the intended 
beneficiaries often through local fieldworkers 
and volunteers. No doubt, the distance between a 
donor based in London or Geneva or Washington 
DC and the project beneficiaries can be quite long 
and complex, involving a variety of horizontal and 
vertical relationships in the transnational field. 
Funding, frameworks, guidelines and technical 
assistance move downwards while reporting, data 
and results move upwards.
The aid chain can also be understood both as 
relationships among organisations (e.g., Northern 
Ministries of Development Cooperation, Northern 
NGOs, Southern NGOs and rural people’s 
organisations), and also as relationships among 
individuals working within and through these 
organisations (Bebbington 2004). Although these 
actors, institutions and relationships are embedded 
in the political economy of uneven geographies of 
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development (Bebbington 2004; Crewe and Axelby 
2013), they are linked to one another and depend 
on each other to perform their respective roles. 
Development practice is a product of this complex 
transnational apparatus with an assortment of 
interests, expertise, technologies and disciplines, 
and flows of people, ideas and resources. This 
arrangement is not by design but must be produced 
and constructed through the everyday practices 
and discourses of development work.
The meaning and effects of these networks depend 
on the institutional forms they take. Thus, the flow 
of aid, professionals, policies and frameworks in 
this transnational space increasingly depends on 
the rules of the game of intergovernmental and 
multilateral institutions of global governance. 
Foreign aid-funded development programmes and 
projects operate through networks which channel 
uneven flows of resources. Some of these networks 
involve governmental and multilateral institutions, 
whereas in others nongovernmental organisations 
are more prominent. Within such networks, ideas 
and normative arguments about development 
are debated and translated into intentional forms 
of intervention; resources are negotiated and 
distributed; and orthodoxies about ‘best practice’ 
are formed and challenged (Bebbington and 
Kothari 2006: 851).
Prior social and institutional networks shape 
these activities (Bebbington and Kothari 2006). 
Given such intersections of relationships, 
ideas, and institutions, Collier and Ong (2005) 
suggest that it is more helpful to think of such 
transnational and global phenomena, and of the 
forms they take in localities, as ‘assemblages’, 
‘ensembles of heterogeneous elements’ of global 
forms ‘articulated in specific situations’ (Collier 
and Ong 2005: 4-5). Forms such as rationalities 
of calculation, techno-science, and systems of 
administration and governance are as much 
implicated in transnational development networks 
as are the actors. The concept of assemblage 
allows us to consider development as a category 
of practice to capture the social and reflective 
processes of development. Assemblage is the 
flexible, contingent, and continuous work of pulling 
different parts together as well as a continuous 
work of ‘ordering’.
Mosse (2005) draws on the concept of actor-
network theory from Latour (1996) to argue 
that the material and conceptual coherence of a 
development programme is performed through 
political acts of ‘composition’ by heterogeneous 
actors—the causal relations of the material world 
as well as intentional human actions (Mosse 
2005). It focuses on tracing the policies, project 
designs, or technologies back to the human/object 
relationships (‘the gatherings’) from which they 
come—not to deconstruct them but optimistically 
to ‘strengthen their claim to reality’. Development is 
the working of the interpretation, and development 
projects need interpretive communities to make 
it legible. Mosse (2005: 8) writes: ‘Donor advisers, 
consultants and project managers are able to exert 
influence only because the ideas or instructions 
they purvey can be translated into other people’s 
own intentions, goals and ambitions.’
Accordingly, in his quest for a more nuanced 
understanding beyond the post-structuralist 
criticism of Ferguson (1994), Mosse (2005) 
argues for the study of institutional practices 
that constitute development policy. Ferguson’s 
critique, while successfully highlighting the 
dimension of power and governmentality, reduces 
the development machine into an ‘anonymous 
automaticity’ because it obscures the ‘complexity of 
policy as an institutional practice’ and disregards 
the diversity of interests behind policy models and 
the perspectives of the actors themselves and from 
the ‘diversity of interests behind policy models’ 
(Mosse 2005: 6). From this perspective, the space 
between the developer and the population to be 
developed, occupied by policies, actors, interests, 
practices and institutional arrangements, offers a 
very useful vantage for the interrogation of these 
arrangements for the development and delivery 
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intermediarieS, brokerS and brokerage of 
international development
of development policies and practices. Studying 
development and foreign aid through institutional 
practice can provide intricate insights into its 
operations and effectiveness as a complex set of 
local, national, and cross-cultural interactions 
involving different actors such as the state, civil 
society, activists, NGOs, international institutions, 
policies and professionals (Lewis and Mosse 2006).
Approaching the debate from the perspective of 
political economy, Cooley and Ron (2002) argue 
that the liberal conceptualisation of transnational 
actors as global civil society does not capture the 
institutional, organisational, competitive and 
fiscal pressures informed increasingly by new 
managerial logics that shape the field. They argue 
that the scrutiny of the behaviour of transnational 
actors such as NGOs and other organisational 
forms needs a political economic approach that 
can be explained by materialist analysis and an 
examination of the incentives and constraints 
produced by the transnational sector’s institutional 
environment. They contend that marketisation of 
transnational actors activities—particularly the use 
of competitive tenders and renewable short-term 
contracting—generates incentives that produce 
dysfunctional outcomes. INGOs compete to raise 
money and secure contracts. These contracts are 
often performance based, renewable, and short 
term, creating counterproductive incentives 
and acute principal-agent problems. They show 
that non-profit INGOs respond to contractual 
incentives and organisational pressures much as 
private firms do in markets.
The approaches discussed above have opened up 
a space for studying intermediaries and brokers 
operating at the interface between different 
worldviews and knowledge systems (Lewis and 
Mosse 2006). Actors such as scientists, managers, 
professionals, researchers, para-professionals, local 
leaders and volunteers; institutions such as NGOs, 
private firms, research and teaching institutions, 
advocacy groups, missionary organisations and 
local associations; and arrangements such as 
projects, programmes and alliances; all with their 
global and local linkages assume a key role in 
linking big ideas and the policies of development 
with the intended beneficiaries and populations. 
‘Transnational development networks are 
geographically extensive, linking, for example, 
London, The Hague, Nairobi, and Kenyan villages; 
they are also institutional in that they connect, 
for instance, governments, non-profitmaking 
organizations, sports clubs, student movements, 
political parties, religious orders, and village 
governance structures.’ (Bebbington and Kothari 
2006: 849)
Commenting on the centrality of intermediaries 
in development in the African context, de 
Sardan (2005), who been working to theorise 
the concept of development brokers based on his 
empirical work in Africa, writes, ‘Interactions 
between the developmentalist configuration and 
African populations do not occur as dramatic 
global confrontations. They develop via discreet 
passageways, relays, extended or restricted 
networks of transmission, interfaces’ (p. 166). It is 
through these intermediaries that the global world 
of international development and foreign aid gets 
connected to the local populations in different 
parts of the world.
A significant proportion of development aid is 
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now mediated through intermediary networks 
that are separate and apart from the classic 
administrative and political apparatus (Lewis and 
Mosse 2006). As discussed earlier in the paper, 
processes of economic liberalisation and political 
decentralisation since the 1980s have impacted the 
modality of aid delivery with the entry of ideas and 
practices increasingly related to decentralisation, 
participation, civil society and partnership. Such 
a trend has diversified sources of power and 
influence through a number of organisations, 
arrangements and networks beyond the centralised 
political apparatus of the past. Over the last two 
decades, health sector reforms imposed on states in 
South Asia and Africa, which are associated with 
the new modalities of decentralised and neoliberal 
aid, have opened up a field of action for a great 
number of intermediary organisations (Robinson 
1997). These intermediary relationships are linked 
to the reform agenda in order to secure value for 
money, enhance aid efficiency and achieve the most 
impact with limited resources (Weisbrod, 1998). 
Thus, donors and international organisations 
involved in dispersing foreign aid now routinely 
employ intermediaries to carry out the function 
of national and international health service 
development and delivery (Berrios 2000; Harford 
and Klein 2005). These intermediaries include 
non-profits, private contractors, management 
consultancies, advocacy groups, research 
organisations, ‘think tanks’ and educational 
institutions, among others. They employ tens of 
thousands of expert professionals, operating within 
the state apparatus or as outside technical support. 
They advise, consult and serve in various official 
capacities and contribute to development and to 
the delivery of projects. They occupy and link the 
space between the funders and beneficiaries/target 
groups, translating the meanings and processes of 
development at both ends (Bierschenk et al 2002; 
Lewis and Mosse 2006). Their image has oscillated 
between catalysts and parasites. Some argue that 
this has resulted in the giving away of aid to these 
contractors (Berrios 2000), while others suggest 
they add new layers, without replacing pre-existing, 
patronage networks and local centres of power 
(Bierschenk et al 2002).
The world of international development and 
foreign aid operate between global policies and 
ideas on the one hand, and local realities on 
the other. As a global enterprise, it mobilises 
universalising tools, instruments, expertise and 
professionals that cut across different political and 
cultural contexts while also responding to local 
socio-cultural and political specificities. To manage 
this, foreign aid and international development 
operates through intermediaries of different types, 
through subcontracting relationship or partnership 
arrangements with NGOs, educational institutions 
and private contractors. While these intermediaries 
need to show their affinity to the local and national 
cultures they have to comply with international 
and global standards, norms and values. In that 
vein, de Sardan (2005) writes that ‘a development 
broker assumes double function: he or she is the 
spokesperson on behalf of technical-scientific 
knowledge and the mediator between technical-
scientific knowledge and popular knowledge…On 
one hand, the development agent must promote 
technical-scientific knowledge and must present 
this as superior to popular knowledge; on the other 
hand, he is supposed to create a balance between 
both types of knowledge’ (de Sardan 2005: 169).
Yet, development workers continue to be 
considered the spokespeople of technical-
scientific knowledge, and trained with this aim 
in mind. Thus, even as these intermediaries 
can be seen as representative of the people and 
communities where they work, and whose voices 
they understand and represent, besides being 
located in a particular socio-cultural field, which 
in the context of Nepal can be found in informal 
institutions such as aafno manche (nepotism) 
or caste/ethnicity-based affiliations (Bista 1990, 
Ramirez 2000), they can be also seen as contractors 
and subcontractors who implement policies and 
programmes on behalf of donors who want to carry 
out development and humanitarian work from afar 
(Watkins, Swidler and Hannan 2012).
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Donors cannot reach their intended beneficiaries 
directly, but rather have to work through ‘aid 
chain’ of other organisations (Watkins, Swidler and 
Hannan 2012). Thus, donors distribute billions 
of dollars to various intermediaries, globally and 
nationally, who again subcontract to implementing 
organisations nationally or locally. In this chain 
of relationships and networks, organisations not 
only deduct their overheads, administrative and 
management costs, they play different roles and 
add values in this line of relationships. The chain 
in these global projects can be quite long and 
complex and is not necessarily limited to a linear 
relationship between donors, organisations and 
beneficiary populations. Borrowing on the work of 
Latour (1996), Mosse and Lewis (2006) have called 
for integrating the concept of ‘translation and 
networks’ in the study of development brokers. This 
helps challenge the sociological certainty implied 
in the study of development brokers where they are 
assumed to have particular careers, strategies and 
competencies (Mosse and Lewis 2006). Instead, 
brokers, as translators, produce and protect 
the fields of development to make them appear 
coherent and logical.
The field of organisations in this chain is 
often heterogeneous with the involvement of 
INGOs, private contractors, membership-based 
organisations, universities, training institutions, 
missionary organisations and hybrid set-ups 
such as Public Private Partnerships (PPP), who 
despite their own interests, are unified in the 
same chain of relationships under the heading 
of a project or a programme. The complexity of 
the organisational field as well as the chain of 
relationships and networks throws management 
challenges to donors and management entities, 
who rely on various management instruments 
and tools in their struggle to produce outcomes 
and results. With the growing focus on evidence, 
donors and organisations involved in the aid 
chain do not just spend time implementing 
programmes and spending resources, but are also 
required to adhere to compliance, monitoring 
progress and demonstrating results. A series 
of complex transactions, financial, numerical, 
technical and linguistic, amongst others, take place 
in this process. It is precisely here that brokers 
play a critical role in the ‘in between space’ to 
‘make things happen’. This involves transaction 
of resources and translation of concepts and 
knowledge systems. The brokers must not just 
acquire, manage and distribute resources but also 
play a role in producing coherence in the highly 
transactional field of development.
Social and political organisation of foreign aid 
and international development is complex. It 
involves multilaterals donors, bilateral donor 
governments, aid-receiving governments, private-
sector organisations, civil society, NGOs and 
social movements, policy makers, professionals 
and volunteers, academics, consultants and 
activists and beneficiaries and various other 
stakeholders. Institutions and individuals involved 
in this assemblage are unequal and reflect uneven 
geographies of development. Financial and 
technical assistance flow not only through these 
actors but are also shaped by knowledge systems 
and different frameworks and instruments. 
Institutions, individuals, frameworks, policies, 
guidelines and knowledge systems remain 
important in shaping and mediating foreign 
aid and development policies and in shaping 
the everyday practice of development. Taking 
brokerage seriously changes the way we think 
about the process and outcomes of international 
development and foreign aid.
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The recent shift in institutional forms of 
international development to subcontracting, value 
for money, use of evidence, result framework, 
and involvement of private-sector contractors 
shows that the field is going through changes in 
the way it is organised. Behind the lofty objectives 
of saving people’s lives, these are projects to be 
managed, experts to be recruited, bids to be won, 
and careers to be secured. As funders increasingly 
rely on larger contracts to get work done, it is the 
larger players, often based in the global capitals and 
with reserve funding, global presence, network of 
expertise, access to science, and an understanding 
of donor language and compliance, who are likely 
to be management entities for global development 
projects. These players then subcontract projects to 
other national and local organisations. Major global 
private contractors such as Research Triangle 
International, John Snow Inc, JHPIEGO1, Abt 
Associates, Options Pvt Ltd, Coffey International, 
Oxford Policy Management, Chemonics, Dexis 
Consulting Group and QED Consulting, or INGOs 
with a global presence such as Save the Children, 
Oxfam, Action Aid, Family Health International, 
World Vision and Population Services International 
can be found in many developing country capitals 
and provinces where they have become key players 
in managing and implementing development 
programmes, often in partnership with local NGOs 
and subcontractors. As funders continue to pour 
resources through NGOs, INGOs and private 
contractors that set up parallel institutions to 
deliver projects and short-term outputs rather than 
channelling funds through the government system, 
such arrangements are likely to have significant 
implications for the capacity of the recipient state 
and its image or morale.
A large part of development aid is spent through 
what is called ‘off budget’ modality (i.e., where the 
resources do not flow through the government’s 
public financing systems) in technical assistance 
1 It was initially called the Johns Hopkins Program for 
International Education in Gynecology and Obstetrics.
or direct project support. Not only do these 
arrangements create ‘coordination’ challenges 
for the central government or the ministries in 
the capital of aid-receiving countries, they may 
promote internal brain drain, aid patronage, and 
competition among the agencies involved. These 
projects demoralise government staff who are 
paid significantly lower or have access to poorer 
facilities compared to NGO or project employees. 
Hence, government employees are often directly 
or indirectly incentivised to spend a considerable 
time to support the discreet activities of the aid-
funded projects at the expense of their own regular 
responsibilities.
A key question is: how does one study the social 
and political organisation of foreign aid and 
international development? A useful starting point 
is to map and follow the structure of organisations 
and their institutional forms in the transnational 
space. Further, it is important to unpack the 
space that exists between policy and practice, 
i.e., to document the everyday role of policy-
makers, consultants, aid workers, professionals, 
activists and volunteers. Beyond the study of 
policy documents, monitoring and evaluation 
frameworks and planning and project documents, 
it is the ethnographic scrutiny of the everyday 
practices combined with interaction with various 
stakeholders at different levels of the aid chain that 
can provide much-needed insights on the working 
of the aid infrastructure. However, carrying out 
ethnographic fieldwork is easier said than done. An 
ethnographer can only observe and participate in 
the practices that can be observed and seen. What 
if the negotiations and practices of development 
are not only carried out in the formal arena but in 
various informal spaces? How does one capture the 
unspoken communication and forms of patronage 
that are difficult to comprehend unless the 
ethnographer is a part of the everyday practice of 
aid? The challenge for researchers is how to engage 
with the informal interactions, relationships and 
negotiations in order to delve into the practices of 
foreign aid and international development.
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